Abstract
Introduction
In academic papers containing definitions and proofs, authentication protocols are usually quite simple schemes: a few messages exchanged, each computed by simple rules. Yet anyone who has examined a real-world authentication spec has seen a different kind of beast-schemes that don't seem simple after all. The Kerberos 5 spec is 138 pages, the TLS spec is 104 pages, and just one piece of the authentication underlying 802.11 security is 175 pages [20, 21, 38] . And it's not just the page counts that reflect the mechanisms' complexity; the real-world schemes are complex from many points of view. The specs often leave some protocol behaviors optional or intentionally unspecified. As an example, the TLS 1.2 spec has 61 SHOULDs, SHOULD NOTs, and MAYs [12, 20] . Because of all this complexity, we would claim that nobody has ever proven the cryptographic security of something like the "full" TLS 1.2; instead, one extracts some piece and goes from there [22, 36] .
Certainly many people have observed this gulf between academic and real-world authentication. Consider the following comment from Krawczyk concerning a standardized key-exchange protocol, IKE [28] , and how it is treated in the author's corresponding academic work:
A word of caution. It is important to remark that all the protocols discussed in this paper are presented in their most basic form, showing only their cryptographic core. When used in practice it is essential to preserve this cryptographic core but also to take care of additional elements arising in actual settings. For example, if the protocol negotiates some security parameters or uses the protocol messages to send some additional information then the designers of such [a] full-fledge [d] protocol need to carefully expand the coverage of authentication also to these additional elements. [29, p. 408] The cautionary note may sound routine; one expects to see some differences between an academic abstraction and a fully worked-out scheme. Abstraction is what we do. But, at another level, the proviso is actually quite alarming: if you prove something about the (self-identified) cryptographic core of an authentication protocol, does this actually prove anything about the full-fledged scheme? An approach in which security-relevant features of real-world protocols are routinely elided in corresponding analyses ought to raise foundational concerns.
Narrowing the gap. We suggest an approach aimed at bridging the gap between simple academic protocols and complex real-world schemes. The real-world scheme is to be regarded as comprising a partially specified protocol (PSP) plus additional protocol details (PD). The cryptographic core of a protocol will not be heuristically identified, but formally defined: it is the PSP. To prove a complex scheme secure, dissect it into a PSP and PD, then prove security for the PSP alone. Definitions for PSP security will be constructed so that this will prove security for the (PSP, PD) pair, and thus the real-world scheme.
The PSP will consist of a key generator (KG ) and a protocol core (PC). Both will be specified in pseudocode. The PC is allowed to call out to the PD. But, for defining security, the adversary itself will service PD calls. This may sound a bit extreme: the PD isn't adversarial chosen, and regarding it as such might seem to give the adversary nearinfinite power to disrupt a protocol's runs. But it does not, as the adversary will be allowed to see and influence only what's actually sent to the PD. The benefit to this pessimistic modeling of the PD is that a proof for a PSP becomes a proof for any full-fledged protocol that extends it by realizing the PD.
One might think that placing real-world protocol functionality within the PD boundary and then ignoring this functionality by replacing it with adversarially-controlled code would, in the end, be no different from ignoring the PD functionality in the first place. It is not so. First, it is a stronger requirement for something to be secure when it is adversarially controlled than when it is ignored. Second, formalizing what is the cryptographic core of a real-world protocol removes this step from the realm of informal, outsideof-the-model considerations. Third, the explicit presence of the PD will motivate an important definitional element: the inclusion of associated data (AD). Finally, allowing PDdetermined AD opens the door to making security claims that reference the AD's contents, and therefore depend on what the PD does, without having to open it up.
What the PD might do. What, anyway, is all this alleged complexity in real-world protocols actually doing? A first purpose was hinted at in the earlier Krawczyk quote: when party A believes she has just had a conversation with B, she will typically hold some information, ad, that encodes what she believes that the two of them have agreed to. Formalizing this idea gives rise to a notion of authentication with associated data. While AD is known in the context of authenticated encryption [18, 40] , it has never been formalized in the context of entity authentication, where it is equally applicable. So one important thing that the PD can do is to choose the AD. The contents of the AD may depend on the principal's security policy. Its value might encode things like the cryptographic primitives that were agreed to, perhaps through a multiple-flow negotiation.
The PD can do more. It can select ancillary data to augment each message flow. Such ancillary data may be used to provide additional functionality, like distributing a session key. The PD can also guide the PSP in selecting what long-lived key to use. It can help the PSP select which instance of a party to dispatch a message to. Or the PD might formulate an error message, request retransmission of a flow, or force a protocol to abort.
Defining MA. Our definitions are in the computational cryptographic tradition. We develop our ideas for the case of mutual authentication (MA), with associated data, in the public-key setting. Other goals and trust models can be handled in a similar vein. Our model refines earlier ones for entity authentication and key distribution (EA/KD) that go back to Bellare and Rogaway [8] and continue with works like [7, 10, 15, 23, 31, 44] .
Our execution model will be described in pseudocode: four model-code procedures, about 30 lines of code, will define what the adversary can do and when it wins. Two more procedures, KG (key generator) and PC (protocol core), comprise the PSP. One last procedure, A, is the adversary itself. The model-code procedures formalize the adversary's presumptive ability to send messages, look up public keys, and corrupt players. The protocol core PC may call a procedure PD for realizing protocol details, with such calls getting routed to the adversary A.
Using a code-based descriptive language for cryptographic definitions not only enables the PSP idea, but may also prove helpful to overcome the length and ambiguity endemic to complex cryptographic notions described in English prose (we are thinking, for example, of UC [13] ). We hope that writing cryptographic notions in code may make them more accessible, precise, and readily compared.
In revisiting notions for EA/KD we also take the opportunity to address a modeling concern. In previous work derived from [8] , instances, not principals, are the conceptual entities to which one sends a message M . For example, the adversary might direct a query to a conceptualized entity Π s i representing instance s of party i. We find both philosophical and pragmatic difficulties with this choice. It implies that a party must tag each message with a session identifier, and that a principal can't, for example, refuse a create a session because too many are already in use. We prefer a model in which principals can create sessions at their discretion and route messages to sessions of their choice, potentially based on private state.
Security of NSL.
After defining mutual authentication with associated data for a PSP, we exercise the definition by using it to prove security for the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe publickey protocol (NSL) [32, 33, 37] . Actually, our proof is not for NSL as it was first described, but for a variant of it that fits our syntax and adds in "hooks," in the form of PD calls and PD-interpreted strings in message flows, to incorporate additional functionality that a real-world NSLbased protocol might choose to add. Let NSL2 name our version of NSL. Using our notions, we will give a reduction to establish that NSL2 is secure as long as it is based on an encryption scheme that is CCA (chosen-ciphertext attack) secure. Our adversaries are dynamic (they may choose whom to corrupt based on information learned during the attack) and our security bound is concrete (as opposed to asymptotic). Our bound is worse than we expected: proven security drops in about q 4 /2 n , where q is the number of adversary calls and n is the nonce length. We suspect this is Figure 1 . Who may call whom. A partially specified protocol Π = (KG , PC ) for MA is run with an adversary A. Procedures are in boxes and an arc from one box to another means the first procedure can call the second.
just an artifact of the current proof but, in any case, it raises the question of how to design and analyze EA/KD schemes so as to not only get a strong notion of cryptographic security, but a tight bound as well.
Related work. We considered NSL not because it needs yet another proof of security, but because it has become somewhat of a "litmus test" for illustrating authentication methodologies. Within the computational-complexity tradition, the security of NSL was first established in independent papers by Backes and Pfitzmann [3] and by Warinschi [44] . The two works use radically different definitions and approaches. Backes and Pfitzmann employ a simulatability framework based on the cryptographic library of Backes, Pfitzmann, and Waidner [4] . While the initial result was a paper-andpencil proof, subsequent work has come to encompass the use of automated theorem-provers and frameworks backed up by cryptographic soundness guarantees; see [14, 16, 34, 42] for work in this direction. Warinschi's paper [44] employs a definition that, like ours, is based on the simpler notions of Bellare and Rogaway [8] . Their prescriptivestyle definition does not attempt to compare a real MA protocol to an idealized one; instead, one directly defines when the adversary does and doesn't win. Warinschi's result was stated asymptotically, assumed static adversaries, and defined partnering by matching conversations instead of through session identifiers (SIDs), but these differences are minor compared to the addition of PD-calls, associated data, and the absence of reified instances within the communications model.
Our execution model resembles a code-based game [9] and, in fact, we maintain that code-based games are a promising approach for giving clean definitions for many cryptographic goals. There is at least one difference between what we do and what code-based games have been asked to do: when an adversary interacts with a game, the adversary calls the game's procedures but the game doesn't turn around and call the adversary. For our definition, considering model code and protocol code as a game, the calls go both ways.
We have not provided a formal semantics for our code, a task we leave to future work. In recent work, Blanchet [11] , Backes, Berg and Unruh [1] as well as Barthe, Grégoire and Zanella [5] each provide such semantics for some formulation of games. Namely, Blanchet represents games in a process calculus with probabilistic semantics with support for polynomial-time computable functions. His tool CryptoVerif heuristically finds transformations to simplify games for goals based on computational indistinguishability. Backes, Berg and Unruh define a typed lambda calculus with support for probabilistic functions (including oracles), userdefined types, and events (such as the canonical bad). They provide a semantics for their language in which programs evaluate to subprobability measures over program states and lists of events. Furthermore they define polynomial run time and formulate the Fundamental Lemma of Game-Playing Proofs [9] in their framework. They embed their type system in the Isabelle/HOL proof assistant to enable automated type inference. Barthe, Grégoire, and Zanella define a probabilistic imperative language pWHILE and show how a variety of bridging steps between games can be expressed as the transformation of pWHILE programs. They implement a tool, CertiCrypt, that verifies game-based proofs written in pWHILE and provides support for concrete-security resource accounting. Using CertiCrypt, they are able to find a tighter reduction for OAEP.
Hui and Lowe [27] share our motivation of bridging the gap between real-world protocols and their abstractions in a rigorous way, though they focus on simplifying the initially modeled protocol, whereas PSPs are useful for describing under-specified protocols as well. Working in a framework based on CSP [26] , Hui and Lowe define transformations on protocols and their traces, giving sufficient conditions for these mappings to be fault-preserving, that is, to preserve the insecurity of protocols for certain definitions of mutual authentication and session-key privacy. They show that several mappings, such as omitting certain fields or extraneous cryptographic operations, are fault-preserving. We are not aware of an analog to fault-preserving transformations in the computational cryptography tradition.
Defining Security of a PSP
Categories of code. Our execution model is described in code: the protocol and the adversary are regarded as procedures, and procedures are used to formalize how it all runs. Thus procedures are of three kinds: protocol code, adversary code, and model code. Figure 1 names the procedures of each kind and indicates which ones may call which others, while Figure 2 defines the model-code routines. In brief, the three types of code are as follows:
Protocol code consists of two procedures: KG , the key generator, and PC , the protocol core. Figure 2 , uses conventions that we will momentarily describe.
While the model does not dictate the internals of protocol or adversary code (routines KG , PC , and A), we do insist that these procedures always terminate, regardless of coin tosses or responses to procedure calls, and that they do so within some bounded number of computational steps (this number of steps is associated to the procedure, of course).
Programming-language conventions. We do not formally define the programming language in which our code is written; it may be regarded as pseudocode. But the intended semantics is conventional enough that, with a bit of explanation, the execution of the model code (and, later, our protocol code for NSL2) should be clear.
To make our model code and protocol code compact, we adopt some specialized conventions. Any variable can take on the value 3, read as invalid, and all variables are silently initialized to this. In Boolean expressions, the symbol 3 is treated as FALSE, as is the integer 0, while nonzero integers are regarded as TRUE. Booleans are interchangeably regarded as bits. Our informal programming language supports variables recursively defined from types array, boolean, integer, record, set, or string. Strings are finite-length sequences over the alphabet Σ = {0, 1}. The empty string is denoted ε. When X 1 , . . . , X m appears as an R-value, as in Figure 2 /line 11 (henceforth to be abbreviated as in 2:11), it means a string that encodes (X 1 , . . . , X m ), including the type of each X i . A matching assignment X 1 , . . . , X m ← X (eg, 2:10) works like this. Parse the string X according to the reverse conventions used for encoding to get a tuple (X 1 , . . . , X m ). If m = m and the type of each X i is compatible with the type of X i then simultaneously set X i ← X i for all i; otherwise don't do anything. Arrays are associative arrays that map arbitrary values to values of some specified type. To declare an array, put brackets after the variable name, as in the declaration string pk[ ] at 2:1. Subscripts and brackets are interchangeably used for element-extraction from an array (eg, pk A = pk[A]). Types are static and can often be inferred; when they cannot, they are strings. Variables are local unless they are declared globally at the beginning of the module in which they appear or are in a procedure's argument list. Procedure return types are inferred (usually they are strings). Variables are passed by value except where annotated by var, at the caller and called routine both, whence they are copy-in/copy-out. Macros can be defined using parentheses, which is the intent at 2:21-24. Further conventions will be specified as needed.
Defining adversarial advantage. Execution of Π = (KG , PC ) with A begins by calling Main and ends when Main terminates, returning a boolean indicating if the adversary has won. Runs will differ from one another because protocol and adversary code may be probabilistic. To realize this probabilism, the programming language includes a probabilistic-assignment statement x $ ← S that chooses an element x uniformly at random from a finite set S. The statement is not seen in Figure 2 simply because modelcode routines for defining MA do not require probabilism.
We define Adv ma Π (A) as the probability that A wins (adversarywins = TRUE) its execution with Π = (KG , PC ) using the model code of Figure 2 . This quantity, the ad- 
Explanation
At this point we have defined our notion of MA. Still, some English-language explanation may be useful to clarify what is going on in the model code of Figure 2 , and why.
Explaining the code. At 2:1-2 we declare string-valued and boolean-valued associative arrays. Player A's public key and secret key are stored in pk A (= pk[A]) and sk A , and party A's state is kept in π A . Recall that all values are initialized to 3, so, for example, initially π A = 3 for all A.
At 2:19 procedure Main initializes a counter n for the number of Send calls to uncorrupted players. At 2:20 it calls the adversary A, passing it the empty string as an indication to A that it has been called from Main (PC 's calls to PD = A should pass in something else). Any return value from A is discarded by 2:20.
As A executes, it may make calls to Send , Lookup, and Corrupt. The first is called to send a principal A some message M , the second to look up the public key of a principal, and the last to obtain a principal's internal state and secret key.
Starting with Send , we begin by disallowing queries to corrupted principals at 2:5. After recording the identity of the party that the adversary wants to send a message to at 2:7, we look up the public key for that party, which is done to make sure that the secret key for A is valid when we call PC at 2:9. There we pass PC the principal's name A (all identities are regarded as strings), the message M the adversary wants to send her, the party's secret key sk A , and the party's state π A . As protocol code may not maintain state across calls, the model code provides this service. The contents of π A are uninterpreted by the model code, but the string π A may be re-cast by PC to whatever type that procedure wants. The PC call must return and, when it does, its string-valued output is parsed and recorded in model-code globals at 2:10. The five components of decns encode: the session ID (SID), a string that names a session; the role, a symmetry-breaking device so that two entities can have the same SIDs but still be regarded as different instances; the partner ID (PID), a string that names a principal; the associated data (AD), a string that records a value that a party believes he shares with his communication partner; and, finally, a bit indicating whether the instance believes to have received confirmation that his partner is there.
With a Lookup query the adversary can learn the public key for any player. The PC too has access to this functionality, which models an out-of-band mechanism to reliably map identities to public keys. With a Corrupt call the adversary can learn a player's secret key and state.
The most tricky part of Figure 2 are the macros and predicates at 2:21-29. Recall that 2:21-24 are macro definitions, to be used in the predicates that follow. Lines 2:21-22 say that an SID is fresh if any party that has that SID remains uncorrupted at the game's end, as does his partner. Line 2:23 captures the following notion. An instance is named by an SID and a role. Two SID/role pairs are regarded as partnered if they have the same SID and different roles (for example, one role may correspond to "initiator" and one to "responder"). Line 2:24 captures a stronger requirement than partnering: not only are the instances partnered, but they also agree in their AD values, and the PID of each party is the identity of the other. Line 2:25 captures the following, nearly "syntactic" requirement. Suppose that one and then a subsequent Send query are answered by the same instance. Then the identity of the party is not allowed to have changed, nor the PIDs, nor the ADs. In short, decisions stick: once an instance (sid, role) chooses a (pid, ad, conf ), he is not allowed to change his mind. Moving on, line 2:26 captures the following idea. Whenever two instances are partnered-they have the same SID and opposite rolesthen each party's PID should be the identity of the other, and they should have the same AD values, too. At 2:27 we formalize the following expectation. Suppose that an instance has confirmed his partner and has a fresh SID. Then there must exist an instance out there that it is partnered to. Finally, line 2:28 says that an adversary defeats the aim of MA if it managed to violate any of the expectations we have described.
Instances and dispatch. Under our model, messages are sent to principals, not to instances, and the model does not maintain separate state for each instance (of course a principal may choose to do so). Fundamentally, instances exist in our model only insofar as decisions coming out of principals (2:9-10) include an SID and role, and the predicates of Main interpret such pairs as though they named a communication endpoint. This set of choices are quite different from prior formalizations of EA/KD [7, 8, 10, 15, 35] , where one addressed messages to instances and instances maintained their own, separate state. In prior definitions, peers were either pre-specified (one sends a message to a Π s i,j that models instance s of party i wanting to authenticate party j) or post-specified (one sends a message to a Π s i that models instance s of party i willing to authenticate someone, their identity to be determined) [15, 35] . Either way, the SID s was specified with every message sent.
Our view is that principals receive messages, not instances. In that case a protocol must decide which instance to dispatch a message to. How should a principal decide? The selection could depend on an SID that is included in the message, but it could also be done based on information otherwise present in the flow. A natural choice is to let the PD choose the instance, based on information rich enough to inform the choice but not so rich as to obviate security. The issue there is that if message dispatch depends on private information known to the principal who receives a message, then one certainly can't quantify over all possible messagedispatch means, as a bad message-dispatch routine could divulge secret keys through the choice of which session a message is dispatched to. On the other hand, if message dispatch may not depend on any private information, then natural dispatch methods are impossible, including those which, as in NSL, need to decrypt an incoming flow to inspect a nonce contained within.
When messages are sent to instances rather than principals, protocols are unable, for example, to place limits on the number of open sessions, which implementations routinely do, or share other state. And session-identifiers effectively must be present in all flows, even if one could do without.
Extensions. It is possible to modify our definition of MA to handle a variety of trust models and goals. For example, to define the secrecy of session keys shared out in an authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocol, augment decision-vectors to include a session key sn, have Main flip a bit b, add in a Reveal query to obtain an alreadydistributed session key, add in a Test query to produce either a targeted session key sn or a sample from the distribution it is supposed to be drawn from, have the adversary output a bit b , and adjust Main's predicates to say that the adversary wins when b = b and the adversary could not know b by trivial means. Switching to shared-key trust models is an easier change than this, as is the addition of a security parameter k, or the inclusion of schemes that employ globally-known parameters (eg, a randomly selected prime or elliptic-curve group).
Our model is not intended to be the strongest one feasible; we have opted for a relatively minimalist model instead. We do not require the concomitant distribution of a shared secret and so, correspondingly, there are no queries to reveal a session key or expire one. You can't reveal session state (no such notion is in the model). Our Corrupt queries provide a principal's state, but not his prior coins. No query allows the adversary to replace a principal's public key with a new one of his choice. We have in fact considered adding in this last capability, which models key-infrastructure attacks (where the adversary may, for example, obtain a valid certificate for an invalid public key). But we find that such queries would complicate our proof and necessitate a technical assumption on the encryption scheme's security beyond its being CCA. 
The NSL2 Protocol
Embellishing NSL. The Needham-Schroeder-Lowe publickey protocol [32, 37] (henceforth NSL) is usually summarized by the flow diagram given on the left-hand side of Figure 3 . Such a diagram is useful and succinct, but it does of course leave much to the reader's imagination. Beyond this, we claim that the protocol suggested by the diagram elides cryptographically significant elements that one would expect to see in a real-world authentication scheme based on NSL. There are no parameter negotiations, public-key certificates, or error messages; there is no possibility of authenticating additional information by adding it within the scope of the (presumably non-malleable) encryption function E; the scheme does not distribute a session key; and, as soon as one adds elements into the flows so that it will, cryptographic claims one has already made of the protocol will probably be lost, as there is no a priori reason to think that the MA property one shows for NSL will continue to hold on the embellished scheme.
To address these issues we define a version of NSL we'll call NSL2. The latter is, to a first approximation, NSL with generic "hooks" that are provided so that the scheme can be extended to include elements like those just mentioned. NSL2 is specified in Figure 4 , doing this in a way that conforms to the syntax of Section 2. A corresponding flow diagram is given on the right-hand side of Figure 4 , but it should be emphasized that such a figure remains no more than suggestive.
We call the α i and β i values that have been added to the flows ancillary data. We expect ancillary data to be chosen by the PD. For example, ancillary data might indicate the choice of an encryption scheme or key, say β 1 indicating A's choice for E pk A and β 2 indicating B's choice for E pk B . It can be used to accomplish a key exchange intertwined with the MA, for instance, letting α 1 = g a and α 2 = g b . Note that even though the β i are not included within the scope of any cryptographic operator, this does not mean that they are security-irrelevant: the string β 1 can impact the PD's choice for α 2 , which is part of what determines the AD.
Explaining the scheme. The partially specified protocol NSL2 depends on a public-key encryption scheme Π = (K, E, D) and a nonce-length n; to be explicit, we will write NSL2[Π, n]. See Section 6 for a formalization of public-key encryption schemes and their security. Under that formulation, our encryption scheme is assumed to have the message space {0, 1}
* and, insofar as we omitted a security parameter in our formalization of MA, the key-generation algorithm K likewise does without.
To help with concision and readability, Figure 4 uses a programming-language construct that generalizes our earlier matching assignment. Suppose we write X 1 , . . . , X m ← X where X is a string and each X i is now a variable, an underlined variable, or an underlined constant. Then we parse X (using the reverse of whatever convention is used to encode tuples of variables into string) to get an mtuple of values (X 1 , . . . , X m ). If m = m and each X i has a type compatible with X i and X j = X j for each underlined X j , then we simultaneously set X k ← X k for all non-underlined X k and the matching-assignment statement itself returns TRUE. Otherwise, set X k ← 3 for all non-underlined X k and the matching-assignment statement returns FALSE. Either way, do not modify any underlined X j . We allow a wildcard, * , to function as an anonymous non-underlined variable of the correct type. As an example of all this, at 4:15 we attempt to parse M into a triple consisting of the string constant RESPOND, a string C 2 , and a third component we don't care about. If we succeed, the string C 2 will now be defined and we will continue evaluating the second half of the conjunct at 4:15 (conjunctions are assumed to evaluate from left-to-right), filling in rcvdN with the second component of the decryption of C 2 . As an additional new convention, procedures are understood to return 3 in the absence of an explicit return statement.
After the type declaration at 4:1-3 we define the two routines exported from this module: KG and PC . The first is trivial, simply returning a string (which presumably encodes a pair of strings) returned by the encryption scheme's keygeneration routine. In the declaration at 4:6, the final argument was a string when PC was called at 2:9, but it is now mapped into a value of type PartyState, with a 3-valued string taken to correspond to an array of 3-entries. We give PD every opportunity to interfere with protocol mechanics, calling it at 4:7 to let it overwrite the message sent in, at 4:9 to let it overwrite the message going out. Such calls can be used for creating error messages, for example, or deleting communications not in conformance with a security policy. We continue to call PD at discretionary points throughout the code. The Dispatch routine is responsible for sending the incoming message to the appropriate handler, sending that handler the protocol-maintained (as opposed to modelmaintained) instance state for the appropriate instance. Instance identification is based on the nonces within messages or, when there is none, a new instance is created. Message are not annotated with anything "extra" to determine the session, as this can be gleaned from what was already in NSL flows.
Procedures Start, Hello, Respond and Confirm are called by Dispatch when a flow of that type is received. The first of these is used simply to request that the protocol begin. Procedure Sanitize is used to strip the state of the one thing that the adversary may not be given when PD is called: access to all nonces. Associated data is determined by the PD on the basis of the principal names, α 1 , and α 2 . For our security result on NSL2 we will need to assume that this particular PD call is deterministic, as we shall now explain.
Security of NSL2
We would like to claim that no reasonable adversary A can achieve good MA-advantage when attacking NSL2, but there is a technical issue that would make such a claim untrue. Since the AD is computed by a call to PD , the adversary could, for example, return a random bit at 4:29 and 4:37, in which case the pairs of AD values that "should" be equal will often disagree. To get around this, the PD calls that compute the AD ought to be deterministic. Formally, let's say that an adversary A is valid if A( 0, · · · ) uses no probabilistic assignment and reads no global variable. This way PD ( 0, · · · ) acts as a function. Of course calls of the form PD (ε) or PD ( i, · · · ) for i ≥ 1 are not impacted; they can use probabilism or A's retained state.
We now quantify the MA-security of NSL2[Π, n] in terms of the CCA-security of the asymmetric encryption scheme Π.
Theorem 1. Let Π = (K, E, D)
be a public-key encryption scheme and let n ∈ N be a number. Then for any valid adversary A making q < 2 n/2 queries there exists an adversary B such that
where B makes at most 3q queries and runs in time comparable to A's.
More precisely, the phrase "time comparable to A's" means this. If A runs in time t and λ is the length of a longest string asked or answered by A, then B's running time will be linear in t log q + q 2 · Time Π (λ). Here Time Π ( ) denotes the maximum number of steps to compute E(pk, X), D(sk, X), and K( ), where |X| ≤ .
The proof of Theorem 1 is given in Section 6. Let us here sketch some of its ideas.
Proof intuition. First we bound the probability that two nonces sampled in two distinct rounds collide. This is trivially seen to be rare, so, in the rest of the proof, we can then assume that there are no such nonce collisions.
The main part of the proof reduces the inability of A to create a "forgery" to the CCA-security of Π. Now it's not at all obvious what a forgery in NSL2 should mean; after all, we start with nothing but an encryption scheme, a kind of object that doesn't normally have an unforgeability guarantee, and an asymmetric one at that, so the adversary can come up with, say, a well-formed HELLO message. Fortunately, our code-based definitions provide a helpful language for what turns out to be a somewhat technical definition for what it means for the adversary to forge a ciphertext. Roughly said, we consider a HELLO message M a forgery if it is accepted by a principal B who believes it came from A, and in fact it does contain a nonce chosen by A for a session with B, but party A never sent M (so the adversary must have modified or created it). We define forgery notions for RESPOND and CONFIRM messages in a similar manner, this time requiring that the recipient's alleged nonce in the message match a nonce it previously chose for communication with the purported sender. Attacks on corrupted parties will not count as forgeries, as they can be trivially mounted.
Given an adversary A that forges NSL2 messages, we can build a CCA-distinguisher B against a nonstandard-butequivalent formulation of CCA security. In this formulation, adversary B is given two encryption and decryption oracles, based on two independent key pairs. When started, our adversary B will pick two random principals A, B (this choice must be specified with care; our set of principals is infinite) and B will encrypt all messages between them using its left-or-right encryption oracles ("left-or-right" refers to the particular formalization of CCA security we will use). In the left-hand argument to the oracles, the adversary will submit the correct plaintext, as with NSL2. In the right-hand argument, it will pass in a plaintext with all nonces replaced by 0 n . (For parties other than A and B, distinguisher B will faithfully simulate all that goes on.) If all left plaintexts were encrypted, the specified behavior will perfectly simulate running NSL2 in our MA-model. If all right plaintexts were encrypted, then, since the nonces are excised from plaintexts and not surfaced through any other means, the messages exchanged between A and B are nearly independent of the nonces. Thus, intuitively, even though the adversary may be likely to forge in the first setting, it cannot possibly do well in the second, which lets us distinguish among the encryption oracles we were given. If the adversary happens to corrupt A or B (which might in fact happen most of the time), then B's initial guess of A, B fails, and it gives up. The likelihood of this contributes a multiplicative loss of q 2 to the first two terms of bound (1) .
The next portion of the proof shows that the absence of both forgeries and nonce collisions is enough to imply partner confirmation (the predicate at 2:25-26). Essentially, the proof for this backtracks the flows exchanged during a protocol, repeatedly using the condition that there are no forgeries to conclude the authenticity of received messages. In particular, we use the fact that PD ( 0, . . . ) is deterministic and that both session participants have the same transcript of the session to conclude they computed the same AD. (One would expect that following this rather tedious portion of the proof would admit automation.)
Finally, the structure of our SID being A, B, C 1 , C 2 together with the assumption that no nonces collide makes it fairly straightforward to show that variables proper and validpartnering will be set. Each of these is a claim about two executions of PC that return the same SID, therefore already agreeing about most of the first two flows, the session participants, and their roles.
The proof intuition we have just described omits many hidden complexities and details, yet we do not see the proof as containing very novel ideas or techniques. Perhaps the nicest thing about it is that writing the MA definition and the protocol in code lends itself to easy referencing and inference chains.
Proof of Theorem 1
Encryption schemes. Adapting the syntax of encryption schemes [6, 24, 39] so that their component algorithms can be called by code, we say that an (asymmetric) encryption scheme is a triple of procedures Π = (K, E, D) such that K takes no input and returns a string pk, sk ; E takes a pair of strings pk, M and returns a string C; and D takes a pair of strings sk, C and returns a string M . We require that for every pk, sk returned by K and every string M we have D(sk, E(pk, M)) = M. This holds for all outcomes of probabilistic assignments that may appear in those procedures.
An adversary A attacking the CCA security of an encryption scheme Π = (K, E, D) may call procedures Encrypt and Decrypt that work like this. Before the adversary is run, we set b Suppose for the moment that forgery is some event. By the definition of Adv ma P (A) and repeated application of the inequality
We continue by bounding the last probabilities above in a sequence of lemmas (and defining forgery). The claim of Theorem 1 then follows by combining the results.
Lemma 2. Let A be an adversary that makes q calls. Then
Proof: We notice that ≤ q nonces are sampled independently from Σ n = {0, 1} n and apply the birthday bound.
Consider an execution of A ma . If v is a variable in the pseudocode of NSL2, then denote by v i the last value v holds in the i-th execution of PC . Further, let corrupt i be TRUE iff party i ever gets corrupted (a party A is corrupted at run j iff corrupt A is TRUE). 
Lemma 3. For any valid adversary
Adversary B asks at most 3q queries and runs in time linear in t log q + q 2 · Time Π (λ), where Time Π (c) denotes the maximum number of steps to compute E(pk, X), D(sk, X), and K ( ) over all strings X with |X| ≤ c.
Proof:
We define an adversary B that runs A in a modified version of the game formed by the model code in Figure 2 and NSL2[Π, n] described in Figure 4 . We assume that, for a fixed bit b, B has in fact access to two encryption oracles Encrypt Let nc be defined as in G ma , and let forgery * (i) be the event that forgery(i) happens and {A 
Note that the answers given to A in the games B 1 and A ma are identically distributed, and the behavior of A in B 1 is independent of the choice of i, j. In particular, the probability of the event {party i , σ.you 
Rearranging equation (2) and applying all bounds we just derived yields: To prove partnered(i, j) it remains to show that we have σ.C 
Conclusions
The notions of this paper were not invented in a vacuum, but in an attempt to prove the security for a specific realword protocol: the Abbreviated Handshake protocol of the draft IEEE 802.11s standard for mesh networking [19, 45] . The protocol there is for authenticated key exchange (AKE) in the symmetric setting. A conventional treatment of the scheme, which was our starting point, would begin by extracting out of the spec a simple four-flow sequence that one would claim to be the relevant object of study. After defining this protocol, one could prove it correct under one of the existing cryptographic definitions for AKE and claim success. But we decided that there would be something deeply unsatisfying with this whole approach. Most of the 802.11s spec would have been elided, including pieces that were clearly of cryptographic relevance. We wanted to make sure we had a proof that would say something about the actual protocol in the spec and in implementations, not some fiction of our design.
In the end, the complexity of the protocol core of the Abbreviated Handshake and the unsettledness of its spec proved to be a major impediment in communicating our ideas, so we switched to NSL, which is not a real-world scheme. It remains a thesis of our work that the PSP idea can be used to faithfully represent a real-world scheme without taking on an unmanageable amount of complexity.
